Thursday, June 7, 2007

So Long Blogger

Normally I don't like to jump around. Honest. However, there seems in my realm of friends to be a mass exodus over to wordpress. Perhaps I am a sheep, but I'd like to think I was curious, tried wordpress and have now decided to go with it. With that said, I've moved over to wordpress. ta da.

Thursday, May 31, 2007

A Summer Reading Change

So a few days back I made the decision to switch my summer reading from Current (New) Progressive Roman Catholic theologies to Roger Haight's Christology. I still have the packet from Prof. Haight's class on the Catholic theologies which I still plan on reading through sometime in the future. If you're curious as to who made the list, he includes the following in the readings: Amaladoss, Aquino, Copeland, Ellacuría, Espín, Goizueta, Gutiérrez, Haight, Johnson, Lonergan, Metz, Nyamiti, Rahner, Schillebeeckx, Schüssler Fiorenza, Sobrino and Tracy.

However, despite such an interesting reading list, I decided to go with Haight's Christology. I didn't want to regret not taking a guided reading from the author on his own material, particularly when AAR itself has held sessions titled "Haight's Thought." So now the blog will get a dose of some hard core spirit Christology that the Vatican (read here: Ratzinger) really doesn't like (but is still faithful to Vatican II, or so Haight claims).

In other news, I finished Volf's The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World and I'll write about it later.

Tuesday, May 22, 2007

Merging Moltmann and Metz: An End Course Review

I was excited at the beginning of the semester to take a Jürgen Moltmann class, but now at the close, I find that I am more partial to Johann Baptist Metz - the other theologian we read for the class. As I thought about closing out the class, I found a tack that incorporates various positions of Moltmann and Metz and begins to both satisfy and improve my own theological voice. As much as this is a closure paper for a class, it is also a continuation paper and, probably most appropriately, a future looking paper toward fusing my own voice with positions certain from Moltmann and Metz. The following sections on Moltmann and Metz are the highlights of their theologies and the class for me.

Moltmann: Future and Hope in Christ and Basileia
The heart of Moltmann’s use of the term “eschatological,” and subsequently his whole theology of hope, is found in the Christological dialectic of the cross and resurrection.1 That is to say, both the suffering death and the glorious resurrection hold an equal amount of weight as they continually inform each other and push us forward into the promise and hope of the future horizon.2 Simply put, “one could say that Christian eschatology is the study of the tendency of the resurrection and future of Christ.”3

While eschatology finds its specific understanding in the cross and resurrection, we cannot rightly understand the death and resurrection without the greater foundation of the basileia (kingdom).4 It is in the cross and resurrection that the basileia and its promises are fulfilled and proclaimed; the basileia breaks into the current reality in proclamation and action about and through the cross and resurrection, while at the same time speaking of a future in the “mission and love of Christ” through the cross and resurrection.5 To understand the cross and resurrection, particularly as the basis for eschatology and the breaking in of the basileia, it is necessary to understand death and re-life as a theological category, as opposed to an andocentric idea. Fundamentally, the cross and resurrection are not existential (Bultmann) or historical (Schweitzer); rather, they are an action that makes our history and locating us within a promise and identity, while pushing us toward the eschaton.6

History is best understood through promise – specifically, God’s revelatory and eschatological promises. History understood this way is history in flux, which is to say history is dynamic and driven by hope rooted in promise.7 The promises themselves and their fulfillment continue throughout history, and this “overspill” changes history from merely event oriented to an ongoing fulfillment and revelation of promise.8 Therefore the active story that history tells, framed by promises, is re-imagined at every fulfillment; the promises become larger and larger as the fulfillments continue and increase.9 Thus history, or the representation of the past, continually changes in light of the revelation of promise/fulfillment. It “will lead us to open ourselves and our present to that same future,” while still mired in present circumstances.10

Eschatology is inherently participatory and political: we proclaim the hope of Christ as the Christ who proclaimed the basileia, while at the same time we imbue the missional idea with Christ-like suffering and solidarity in faith.11 Thus it is hope that fuels our human faith; faith, our belief in the divine, “hopes in order to know what it believes” and it is hope, from our faith, that drives our vitality so necessary to faith.12 Consequently faith and the hope of the future brings the future into the present resulting in church participation in funneling the vision of the future – “righteousness, freedom and humanity” – into the current events of today.13

Metz: Hoping Rightly, Remembering Dangerously, and Solidarity with the Dead
A Christian historical consciousness is radically and diametrically opposed to a “purely historical relationship with the past that not only presupposes that the past is past; it also works actively to strengthen the fact that what has been is not present.”14 Rather Christian historical consciousness – remembering – is a reforming experience; it brings an idea of change, pushing Christians to change not only themselves, but also the surrounding world. “Identity is formed when memories are aroused” and likewise narrative achieves the same ends – we are given a vision of a great past and a brilliant future.15 This idea of a tangible past changes who we are in the present and gives hope to move our current present towards the eschatological hope. Thus the Christian vision of dangerous memory interrupts our conception of the present, by giving an alternate vision of history; we are re-contextualized within a different story, an informative and liberating story. This new and biblical story, informs us on who we are, gives a new identity – practitioners of a social, Christian praxis.

Simply put, envisioning the Christian mission through memories is the beginning of solidarity with the dead. We are made responsive to past suffering through anamnesis, for it is the nature of Christianity to imitate the suffering Christ, as it is also a religion of the oppressed.16 Thus the Christian praxis, attuned to suffering, consistently interrupts the apathetic world through solidarity for and with the helpless and suffering, in the present.17

However, we have lost the “messianic praxis” of “discipleship, conversion, love, and suffering”, because we have accepted the secularized notion of a nationalistic anthropology and hope (both espousing the ideology that humanity will overcome, thrive, and conquer future frontiers).18 With secularized theologies and the forgetting of Christian suffering, the church does not act in its prophetic role to the world; instead of liberating, the ideology holds the globe within Americana’s oppressive custody.19 The secularization of the church through a form of secular hominization has caused us to lose not only the idea of suffering with and for others, but we have also lost ourselves. Thus the American church has ceased remembering the atrocities of Auschwitz, or cannot respond well to current genocides, by accepting the hope of American promises.

Metz: Bourgeois religion and Privatization
A Bourgeois religion is dependent on privatization; in order to envision the Messianic nature of Christianity, we must first understand who we are.20 How we see ourselves is less universally governed by the church’s direction or definition, rather, as American’s our most universal understanding as to who we are is fundamentally through individual and nation-state interaction – a privatizing, enlightenment document we call the Constitution. The American Christians needs to realize the influences of the Constitution and understand how the idea of a church is fundamentally a contrary social institution – the body of Christ.21 We can only get to the Christian call when we get past the American Dream and its hopes.22

Moltmann, Metz, and I in Agreement
As a person “the Christian has the responsibility to develop his faith’s relationship to the world as a relationship of hope, and to explicate his theology as eschatology.”23 All of Christianity, not just single Christians, is to be grounded in a “horizon of eschatology,” and more specifically in an eschatological foundation that is primarily a creative and militant.24 Thus the church reveals the Christian forward-looking hope to the world. This revealing is inherently political, as it forms the church according the mission of Christ and moves the church toward declaring the eschatological hope of the kingdom to the world.25

It is the church that stands within the kingdom, as the kingdom’s mission; it is the church that continually interrupts the world’s attempts at self-redemption or self-production through love, sacrifice and solidarity.26 The church is the breaking of the kingdom into the now by visibly crystallizing the intensifying nature of the Christological sacrifice on the cross.27 Thus the church points for the world from the suffering and resurrected past to the future and its hope. Fundamentally, the church interrupts the world, by proclaiming the hope of the future in a revolutionary and imaginative way; the center of Christian life is rooted in the forward-looking, eschatological hope that places Christianity within the kingdom within the world.

Moltmann and Metz in Contrasting Ecclesiology
Despite their many similarities, Moltmann and Metz have divergent approaches to ecclesiology. This is especially clear when Moltmann asserts that the church ought not “claim any direct power in secular matters,” specifically in economics, politics and culture.28 Metz disparages bourgeois Christianity in favor of a messianic Christianity that requires the de-privatization of Christianity. In contrast, while Moltmann supports liberation, he does so by way of individual Christian action in the political, economic, and cultural sphere that results in the ethical actions of the church carried out through the privatized social contracts between citizens and government.29 For instance, when Moltmann talks about a Christian opposition to immoral ethical systems, he does not appeal for collective church action such as withdrawal or criticism – instead he uses the word “Christians,” which connotes individual movements.30

Metz calls for the church to be the relational model that answers the Christian call by continually critiquing both the church and the world. It is through this that the church becomes a vision for the world to understand right relationships through the basileia of God. However, Moltmann distinguishes himself from this – the church does not become the agitator for resistance or representation, nor is the church supposed to be envisioning and displaying right relationships concerning racialism, sexism, or valuing the handicapped; instead, the social problems are confronted by a reformationist idea of justification and the I-identity.31

I much prefer Metz’s ecclesiology over Moltmann’s. Moltmann leaves his theology, and subsequently the church, open to a modernist individualism when he calls for the church not to involve itself in economics, politics, or culture. The church ceases to become a holistic, alternative reality and critique to the secularized world when individualism governs the church’s dialogue with the world, and thus the church lacks greater strength engage structural evils.

Blending Metz and Moltmann
I highly value Moltmann’s emphasis on faith, hope, dialectical Christology, and basileia. Not only are they decidedly Christian categories, but they also work well as a foundation upon which to build a political theology. Likewise with Metz, I am heavily indebted to his formulations of solidarity with the dead and dangerous memories, along with his critiques of secularization (as apposed to hoping rightly), Bourgeois religion, and privatization. The merging of Moltmann and Metz in both their agreements and understanding their disagreements is very fertile ground. I am grateful for the strong foundation they offer as I begin to construct my own theopolitical voice.

________
1. Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993) 200.
2. Ibid., 211.
3. Ibid., 195.
4. Ibid., 216.
5. Ibid., 210-211, 220.
6. Ibid., 165, 181.
7. Ibid., 18.
8.Ibid., 107-108.
9. Ibid., 105.
10. Ibid., 108.
11. Ibid., 211, 212, 219, 224.
12. Ibid., 33.
13. Ibid., 22.
14. Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History and Society: Toward a Foundational Political Theology, (New York: Seabury Press, 1979) 190.
15. Ibid., 66, 188.
16. Ibid., 52, 71.
17. Ibid., 57-58, 229.
18. Johann Baptist Metz, The Emergent Church: The Future of Christianity in a Postbourgeois World, (New York: Crossroad, 1981) 27 and Theology of the World, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969) 68.
19. Johann Baptist Metz, Faith and the Future, (Maryknoll, N.Y.; Orbis Books, 1995) 55.
20. The Emergent Church, 12.
21. Theology of the World, 133.
22. Ibid., 146.
23. Ibid., 90.
24. Ibid., 90, 94.
25. Theology of Hope 330, 337, 338.
26. Ibid., 338; Metz, Faith in History and Society, 171.
27. Faith in History and Society, 89.
28. Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993) 167.
29. Ibid., 164.
30. Ibid., 174.
31. Ibid., 194, 182-186, 189.

Monday, May 21, 2007

THO

I recently made my way again to the seemingly defunct Christian satirical website, The Holy Observer, only to find that they are starting up again after years of ... deadness? Anyways, I was plenty happy to discover that they are no longer dead and figured those who appreciate a bit of dry humor would like to know. So go see 'em.

The Current State of Affairs

"Good news everyone!" (said in the Professor’s voice from Futurama) I finished all my classes for the semester, which means the school year is over. Yay. Now for those summer readings I signed up for. Doh. However, I do plan on posting some thoughts from the readings which I posted off to the side, right over there --->. So stay tuned for torture, theology and current, progressive Roman Catholic theology.

Now for the real reason for this post. After a year at Union, I find my self in an interesting and expected, but also awkward place. And that is to say, I am stuck between orthodoxy (right belief) and orthopraxy (right practice) – the tradition I grew up in and that which my undergrad also espoused in contrast to progressive Christianity taught here at grad school.

First, what really is orthodoxy and orthopraxy?

Orthodoxy today ranges from hard-core fundamentalists to progressive evangelicals (and beyond) and while their doctrine (core tenants of belief and other peripheral beliefs) may differ widely, their common link is through the foundational idea of specific, correct belief (orthodoxy). No matter how much a 1611 King James Only person disagrees with someone from, say Tony Campolo or Jim Wallis, it is a disagreement on what is right, on what to believe.

In orthopraxy creativity and imagination are privileged and exalted, and largely it is a creative imagination that constructs a philosophy and hints at the language used here at Union (“using theology”), rather than an imagination that revisits Christian metaphors in a new, descriptive light (or at least it was that way with some, while others do both – use and revisit for a fresh understanding of belief). I have observed numerous times students employing the word “using” when talking about theology, as though theology is there to lead to an ethic or a specific response that the student desires; theology is an imaginative reasoning that is conditioned from the beginning by a problem and must result in the answer the student is looking for. No wonder theology seems formulaic or tool-like and the aim more about the outcome than on the theology itself – it is. Most simply stated, liberal theology is pragmatic to the core.

I think this idea of theology, reasoning towards a specific conclusion, is what grates on me (however, do not get me wrong, I am not condemning reason at all). Perhaps I am still essentially orthodox in this respect or leaning towards a conservative liberal (whatever that is), but I know I felt far more sympathy and companionship with Pittenger (a process theologian) who covered the Trinity, ecclesiology, revelation, the hypostatic union, miracles, and more, than most process theologians. Pittenger largely stayed within a theological framework, describing the classical Christian images, while appropriating Whitehead and sought to rethink the basic metaphors of the Christian faith (Gary Dorrien, American Theological Liberalism: Volume 3, 198). I can roll with a few process theologians, but most seem to annoy me because they seem out of reach – some are more philosophers than theologians.

On the other hand, orthodoxy has its limits it seems to me. Perhaps orthodoxy and orthopraxy are two sides to the same coin. It seems to me that while I simply want to collapse the categories into each other, maybe I ought to be okay with the mystery and tension without dissolving the dialectic. I suppose the rest of my life will be a conversation between the two sides, I am not sure I could have it any other way, but that does not make it any easier. Its hard to have closure (that is if one ought to) when trying to live in tension.

Monday, May 14, 2007

Ekklesia Project

Its official now. Despite that I've been a signer for a year or two now, I'm be going to my first Ekklesia Project Conference this summer (July 16-18 in Chicago). Yay. Who else is going?

Monday, May 7, 2007

A Book Meme

I was included in a meme about books. However, it was nearly two years ago. Oops…. Well better late than never right?

How many books do you own?:

A lot. I’d say some where around 800 now, maybe more. I once tried to count them in undergrad, but I lost track after awhile.

Last book I read:

Well for class that was Gary Dorrien’s The Making of American Liberal Theology: Crisis, Irony, and Postmodernity. For fun? Uh, hm. I did get half way through Dorrien’s The Word as True Myth during Christmas break.

Five Books That Mean a Lot to Me:

The Crucified God by Jürgen Moltmann,
Torture and Eucharist by William Cavanaugh,
Risks of Faith by James Cone,
A Theology for the Social Gospel by Walter Rauschenbusch, and,
aw why not, Theopolitical Imagination by William Cavanaugh (I really like what that guy writes.)

And now to tag five people:

Halden, you meme fiend (I will be getting to that favorite theologian soon) choose some books – however, we already know Jensen and Lewis will be on your list, so find some others, dear God find some others… heh.

Adam M, post away.

Travis “I’m living in the Midwest” Waters, how about you bring some landlocked fun.

Mike at Catholic Anarchy, you can’t be all Cath…er bad with someone as much fun as Metz. Perhaps you could bring some color to our dreary, white-walled Protestantism?

And lastly, I’d like to see if anything changed in nearly two years (which is conceivably enough time for the meme to go all the way around the internet and back), so Chris, have you got a new list?

As for the rest of the readers of this blog, feel free to post away as well, this is by no means exclusionary, rather, I would at least hope to insure some response from someone and therefore the list above.

Thursday, May 3, 2007

More Moltmann and Metz

The Question: Granting the analogy between the ecclesiologies of Metz and Moltmann on the fundamental level, do you find Moltmann's X substantially differentiates his ecclesiology from Metz's or is Moltmann's ecclesiology sustantially the same as Metz's?

Moltmann and Metz share many similarities, nevertheless, Moltmann’s tendency to privatize Christianity diverges from Metz.

Moltmann and Metz share a great deal in common. In the preface to the paper back edition (1990), Moltmann calls for a move towards a small ecclesial community, similar to Metz (xiii). Also in the readings, Metz is footnoted twice (17, 276), particularly concerning the political nature of Christianity. Despite these and other similarities, Moltmann stands in contrast to Metz when Moltmann asserts that the church ought not “claim any direct power in secular matters,” specifically in economics, politics and culture (167).

Metz continually rails against a bourgeois Christianity in favor of a messianic Christianity and to do so requires the de-privatization of Christianity. In contrast, while Moltmann calls for liberation, he does so by way of individual Christian action in the political, economic, and cultural sphere that results in the ethical actions of the church carried out through the privatized social contracts between citizens and government (164). For instance, when Moltmann talks about a Christian opposition to immoral ethical systems or actions, he does not call for the church to break away or criticize in some fashion, rather he uses the word “Christians” which connotes an individual’s movements, rather than the movement of the body of Christ (174).

It seems that Metz calls for the church to be the relational model that answers the Christian call, a model that both continually critiques the church and the world. It is through this that the church becomes a vision for the world to understand right relationships through the basileia of God. However, Moltmann distinguishes himself from this – the church does not become the agitator for resistance or representation (194), nor is the church supposed to be envisioning and displaying right relationships concerning racialism, sexism, or valuing the handicapped (182-186); instead, the social problems are confronted by a reformationist idea of justification and the I-identity (189).

_______
Text quoted is: The Church in the Power of the Spirit. However, the pages we did read were not the entire book so as to find some congruence with Metz's more systematic approach. It seems possible that my critique is off base, but after reading Prof. Haight's comments, I think I do have a point that is not dealt with elsewhere in the text and therefore can stand.

Philemon Revisited

In a course titled “Advanced Bible Study Methods” during my undergraduate studies, I was given an assignment similar to writing a biblical theology of Philemon. The goal was to focus upon themes, attempting to find the overarching theme and its progression throughout the text. I interpreted the central theme as brotherly love, and encapsulated the resulting developed concept thus: “To love your brother and/or sister is the end all for Christian ethics – love is fundamentally how we ought to see others who are in Christ.” For this textual interpretational essay, I have elected to re-examine both Philemon and my previous assignment.

Having looked back at my previous assignment, I am in fact quite embarrassed as to my writings and thankful that I have made my way to Union. Largely the previous assignment does not seem directly counter to what Philemon states, rather the previous assignment misses out on a great deal of other themes within the text and possibly the thrust of the document. This essay will not be a restatement of my previous paper, rather, I envision a telling critique and better interpretation of Philemon.

Philemon as Sibling Love
There is no doubt that Philemon speaks the language of love and indeed love is informative as it guides our relationships one to another.1 After all, Paul and Timothy are connected to the intended audience through close relational terms, familial terms in fact (brother, dear friend, co-worker and fellow-soldier) and most importantly linked directly through the love of Christ.2 Indeed Paul continues the theme of sibling love, proclaiming the joy he receives from the love that the intended audience gives, but also urging the audience on further through a prayer and noticeably not through a demand.3 The author maintains a sibling dynamic with the audience, appealing on the basis of love and good will through Christ.4 Likewise, the author continues to maintain a family dynamic, stating how valued Onesimus has become to him (like a father to a son) and now, Onesimus is precious to Paul as his “own heart” in which Paul sends out.

The theme of love continues throughout the rest of the text, however, the love that I saw was a gentle love – a comfortable love, but really, a love that was lacking the sharp edge to actually cut at evil, social structures. My previous interpretation missed the part of the love that turned the emperor on his imperial head. I did, fortunately, recognize that: "this love subverts the traditional response of a master to a runaway slave. Instead of lashing out in severe rage and dispensing a sanctioned revenge under patriarchal law, love brings mutuality to the relation between the master and slave. While the structure of slavery might still exist, this love submits the harsh reality of slavery to the loving reality of Christian mutual submission."

Nevertheless, the applications I derived from the exercise, while they were needed changes in my life that I genuinely professed, lacked anything other than encouragement, love, and graciousness. Though these applications were relational, they were in fact rather privatized – none of them offered anything in response to the injustice of social structures. After four whole years studying how to see the text, I still saw a kind love, not a love that deconstructed evils or that stood for the oppressed and enslaved. I saw the comfortable kind of love that a white, partriarchal Bible college will profess: mutual submission. Apparently, I had to come to Union to see what I missed.

Philemon Revisited
Somehow, in all the interpretation that I did, I missed the intentionally liberative edge of the text. I first missed the opening salvo: the Pauline prayer in verse 6. It is worth noting the repetition (the function of which is similar to an inclusio) in verses 4-7: that Paul and Timothy receive encouragement, joy and thank God for the faith and fellowship of the intended audience. Verse 6 is different, as it is a prayer or wish of Paul’s, surrounded by the profession of encouragement that Paul and Timothy receive.6 It consequentially legitimizes the audience, their faith and fellowship.

Verse 6 also appears to point toward the argument that Onesimus’ redemption from slavery is part of the Christian call. The sharing/fellowship of the faith becomes all the more effective when the audience understands and sees the good done in Christ – contextually this seems to be the sibling love for one another. The author calls for the audience to understand deeper their faith and fellowship among believers – a faith and fellowship that is not oppressive or allows for the worldly structures into the “church in their house.”7 The placement of the prayer in verse 6, sandwiched between the saints and their encouraging love, appears to proclaim that this prayer, subtly calling for Onesimus’ release, is just as much for the good of the community as it will be a witness of the community.

I also missed the crucial, and indeed, explicit transition of Onesimus’ status in verse 16. As Paul intercedes, Onesimus ceases to remain at the level of a slave in his relationship to Philemon; rather, Onesimus becomes a brother – he is liberated within the Christian fellowship. The relationship between Philemon and Paul is not the only relationship that the text speaks to; it speaks also to the transforming of the relationship between Philemon and Onesimus: “no longer as a slave but as more than a slave, a beloved brother—especially to me but ho much more to you, both in the flesh and in the Lord.”8 The slave in the relationship becomes brother, and the master-slave hierarchical dynamic is transformed into one of brotherly equality.

Furthermore, the Letter of Paul to Philemon is a freeing argument and reaches beyond mere guiding already established relationships within the fellowship into Christ, the love that Paul calls for is redemptive and corrects our relationships one to another.9 As significant as the redemptive action that Christianity enacts when it brings people together as siblings, much more happens in the world outside of Christian relationships within the text. This text becomes a political text as Onesimus seems to be freed from the political world of the emperor who saw him as a slave; this letter is an action by Paul as the body of Christ intervening for liberation in other areas of the body of Christ from the oppressive structure of slavery that the world attempts to impress upon the fellowship.

Paul intercedes for Onesimus not only with words, but with action as well. Paul calls for the fellow Christian to not hold Onesimus liable, and to let Paul pay for any wrong.10 Yet Paul does not stop at mere repayment; he anticipates something far greater of Philemon: “Confident of your obedience, I am writing to you, knowing that you will do even more than I say.”11 And as Paul anticipates this greater action on the part of his fellow Christian, perhaps the freeing of Onesimus, Paul’s promise to visit confirms his own plans to follow up on his promises and personally see the matter to its conclusion.

Lastly, now I am hesitant to assert the link I made between Ephesians and Philemon was correct, or at least there ought to be a re-understanding the Ephesians text, otherwise my assertion that Philemon acts like an extension of the Ephesians text is woefully incongruent with the “household codes.”

Safety and the Edge
I find it rather telling that I developed an interpretation that recognized a love that turns over master and slave dynamics, but shied away in my application from the kind of dangerous love that was clearly called for. In fact, this interpretation I think says just as much about me as it does the text itself – certainly I have grown some, but to do so I needed to leave the white theology behind in order to find the edge within the text and its dangerous love.

_________
1. v. 4, 7, 9, 16
2. v. 1, 3
3. v. 4-7
4. v. 9
5. v. 10-12
6. v. 4-5, 7
7. v. 2
8. v. 16
9. v. 16
10. v. 18-19
11. v. 21

Sunday, April 29, 2007

Flying Farther

As I look around the theoblogosphere, I've noticed that the title for this blog might seem odd, or even perhaps patronizing, in comparison to other titles. It is also not very descriptive up front, so here is my effort to give a better descriptive identity to a blog titled flying.farther.

I got the title from my favorite Jars of Clay song. (Now don't pigeon hole me into "Christian Music", after all some of my favorite bands are: the Decemberists, Death Cab for Cutie, Crosstide, Queen, Lovedrug, and moody, slow Chopin sonatas and preludes. However, this Jars song has got to be one of my favorite songs. I highly suggest that one gives it a listen somehow, it was in the White Elephant sessions cd.) As you will probably notice over time, I really, and I mean really, like ecclesiology. I titled the blog "flying.farther" because with a creative interpretation, the song can be understood as a relational reading of the body of Christ -- we love one another through this life and onto the next, inspite of the pain associated with the fallen world. Also, it has a depiction of solidarity with the dead: heartfelt rememberance. The outcome of the reading is that I myself do not move farther, but rather we all grow old together, moving farther into the promises of God and the Divine itself.

Flying Farther
He picked her up some flowers
On a sunday afternoon
They sat out on the porch swing
Underneath the cresent moon

Life times seemed to pass
Staring at the skies
And on the swing he gave her the ring
There were tears in her eyes

He said I pray I'm not alone
In my dreams about forever
You and I could become one
And always be together

We'd grow old and wise
Through all the days
For worse or for better
And now the truth cause I love you
Even now more than ever

And a lifetime flies but we'll fly farther
Into the night where the eyes of loneliness can never bother
All our dreams of together uneclipsed by never never
Lifetime finds it's in your eyes, but we'll fly farther

Fifty years have ridden off into the sunset
And the tears that we have cried have overflown
Here we are counting scars, wounds of life and ending upsets
Your with me and I'm with you and I will never forget

Lifetime flies but we'll fly farther
Into the night where the eyes of loneliness will never bother
All our dreams of together uneclipsed by never never
Lifetime finds it's in your eyes, but we'll fly farther

He picked her up some flowers
On a sunday afternoon
He rode the Grayhound bus past the house they used to swoon
He knelt beside the grave, hung his head, a teardrop fell
And on the stone the epitaph shone the words he knew so well...

Lifetime flies but we'll fly farther
Into the night where the eyes of loneliness will never bother
All our dreams of together uneclipsed by never never
Lifetime finds it's in your eyes, but we'll fly farther

Lifetime flies but we'll fly farther
Into the night where the eyes of loneliness will never bother
All our dreams of together, uneclipsed by never never
Lifetime finds it's in your eyes, but we'll fly farther

We'll fly farther
We'll fly farther

Friday, April 27, 2007

Looking for the Puppeteer: Constantine, Housio of Cordoba, Imperial Power, Doctrinal Formation, Theologians and Historians

I have a warning. This post is long, but it really in no way lends itself to a shorter or more conversational post. It is already fairly conversational, despite that it turns out to be a paper on historiography. Also, shortening more than it already is would weaken the integrity of the argument and I certainly do not want to do that, for this could fly in the face of a number of my theological friends and I want to be careful with what I say and how it is backed up.

This post calls into question Stanley Hauerwas’ history of “Constantinianism.” I still like a lot of what Hauerwas says (he is far more experienced and smarter than I’ll ever be and I do not mean to be presumptious), but I think his use of history, particularly the reliance on a couple of events around Constantine is shaky ground. I think if we are going to run with a political theology (rooted in history, or memory if we want to be Metzian) about interaction between the church and the modern nation-state, then William Cavanaugh presents a very good interpretation of the historical landscape beginning with the European early modern period (in Theopolitical Imagination). Anyways, I do not get into Cavanaugh in the post, perhaps later, but I do end with a construction about what I think Hauerwas really can or should say.

Approaching Critically the Past and Present

As I have grown as a theologian and become increasingly aware of theological conversations, the controversial issue of imperial power and early Christian formation has come to the forefront in my life so to speak. First there is Stanley Hauerwas’ assertion about the Constantinian shift (Constantianism).1 While the Hauerwas’ condemnation of Constantinianism is nothing particularly new, per se, my exposure to Hauerwas’ work is relatively recent, as my first exposure was around four years ago. Soon to follow on the heels of Hauerwas, at least in my life, was the popular Da Vinci Code. While the Da Vinci Code itself was nothing scholarly, and largely inaccurate even when it did claim to be correct, I did begin to see a deeper question developing: How much influence did secular power have in the formation of Christianity? And more importantly, was the imperial power corrupting?

However, as I researched I realized that answering these two questions are exceedingly complex and possibly not entirely answerable, or at least directly, for the following reasons:

Little Documentation
We have very little documentation for what is seen as this history changing event. There is nothing from left from the Council of Nicaea – there are no surviving writings from during the Council, not even the creed, and the reason we have it now is because it was later saved on paper in a following council that revised the Nicene creed.2 In fact, “Within twenty-five years a leading participant in the council wrote a book about it and had to rely on his memory for an account of what went on.”3 For such an important council, that seems to some to have determined the fate of Christianity with some sort of finality (Hauerwas and the Da Vinci Code), it is rather telling to have only minute information about it from sources written years later.

With such a skewed vision of what happened, or simply a lack of knowledge, the imagination of anyone can pervade the events to their liking; something outlandish can appear to be reality and the only response is, “Perhaps, but probably not because we just do not know.”

Councils are not Quick or Alone
Little documentation concerning Nicaea takes on an even greater importance than it ought to when Nicaea becomes one of the privileged moments in history. When Nicaea becomes a larger than life event, the event then incorrectly eclipses the surrounding context – a context of continuous creed making and argument. The problems concerning Christology were never totally finished in Nicaea, but to say the contrary, or to view Nicaea alone as the starting or ending point, is to misunderstand Nicaea in relation to not only the Arian conflict, but also to the other great creeds, like Constantinople I, Ephesus and others, that followed in an attempt to reform and improve the Christological understanding.

We cannot ignore the continuation of the Arian conflict, in which emperors continued to weigh in on. When we say “Constantinianism”, rather we must understand any “Constantinianism” as at least a process that continued long beyond the death of Constantine to at least Constantinople I to find fruition in Theodosius I’s raising Christianity to officially the state religion, if we are not reaching farther to Chalcedon. This is if one is to use the term “Constantinianism” at all. A sweeping change of status and power was not achievable by one ruler (there were sons and successive emperors necessary to carry on the work), as nor was Christianity unified by one Council.

Everything in a Word
As much of a problem it is to focus on one council, particularly one we know through second hand histories, it is even more problematic to base one’s idea of how the induction of one word occurred. It seems that often Homoousion becomes a microcosm for the whole discussion of imperial power in the church and the point where one stakes a claim on the imperial intervention, despite the fact that the emperor did not have the right to vote, but only to confirm and pronounce the vote as an edict and was also barred from the Eucharist and membership in the church since we was not baptized.4 Of course we have writings that say that Constantine brought up the word itself, but was it in exasperation or was it part of a grand conspiracy or was it something in between? The sources do not tell us if it was a suggestion or a heavy-handed order from the emperor. We know Constantine desired to unify his empire and wanted to use Christianity to that end, however, that still tells us preciously little about the back-story of presenting the word.

Also, something rarely taken into account by anyone other than the professional historians, is the influence Christians had on Constantine about presenting Homoousion. It is entirely possible that Housio (or Ossius) of Cordoba, the adviser to Constantine, prompted Constantine to suggest the word. And likewise a similar circumstance occurred with the Donatist controversy.5 Perhaps the puppet was the emperor himself.6 It seems tenuous at best to rely heavily on one council to define an outlook, much less the introduction of one word and the little we know about the atmosphere in which it was birthed, other than that the Arians objected, but still signed.

Constantine Scrubbed Clean
Constantine seems scrubbed clean by many Christians and some historians, both past and current.7 The texts passed down that “chronicled” the greatness of Constantine were explicitly meant to influence how we understand “Constantine the Great” and in there seems to be little account as to the moral diversity of actions committed by him. There is the assumption that Constantine was the first Christian emperor, and a glorious one at that, rather than an emperor who had a vision of Apollo and seemed to have continued to continue pagan practices with his so called Christianity.8

Many texts also gloss over theopolitical developments around the time of Constantine and the affects of Caesarpapistic Christologies, as both Nicene and Arian contended for, for a time.9 At least one view held that the emperor is “not the ruler of one people, class or religion: he is the just ruler and saviour (sic) of all. The emperor is to be like God in all respects, a heavenly being, … he is most like God, [in] is his philanthropia [love of humankind]. His mind intent upon heaven, he strives to be the image of God…the imitation of God’s fatherhood.”10 In this sense, the emperor becomes a manifestation of God – the image of the Logos – an avatar, an incarnation, or theophany if you will.11 As the emperor is the avatar, the “authority of the emperor stems not from the people or the army but from God” and the word of the emperor “may be taken for a canon.”12

Combining this development of theopolitical identity with the previous identity of emperors, largely manifested in the cultic worship of a human who will die and become divine, the office of emperor becomes an interestingly tricky and problematic place for Christians theologically and politically. As the emperor assumes divine-like closeness, Christians and historians of the past and today, possibly incorrectly, call the relationship apostleship or “sanctification of the temporal order”, instead of an imperial grab for equal status with Christ.13 Dr. McGuckin asserts that this move towards closeness was the attempt by Constantine to assert himself as both Christ and the Unconquered Sun of Apollo, which he seemed to have dialectically maintained through his life and even into death.14 Thus, to call an emperor – Constantine – solely Christian, who interestingly seemed to reflect the modern evangelical concept of radical conversion, by later Christians results in the historical bleaching of the emperor identity and acceptance of Christian history, or propaganda, as truth. While the Nicenes eventually pulled away from Caesarpapism, but only when Constanius, an Arian, rose to power; nevertheless, to act or write as if there was little complexity in the conflicting debates is disingenuous at best.15

Also, with a Constantine scrubbed clean, there is little way of showing how the Nicene faction began to assert ecclesial independence and reaction against any attempts by Constantine to assert an emperor cult within Christianity or Constantine’s movement towards Arianism through Eusebius of Nicomedia.16 The assertion of ecclesial independence and its Caesarpapism is vital to the understanding of Church and State relationship in centuries to follow, particularly within the fourth century where the Arian crisis continued unabated for years.

These are Modern Questions
On a final note, these questions are fundamentally modern questions; these questions are not, it seems, what the early Christians would be asking about Church and State. We ought to proceed carefully so as to not project the idea of the modern nation-state onto the past, and also not to assume that there was some form of separation of Church and State. “There was no place in the thought of Eusebius (or the Arian Reviser) for two related but distinct societies, the church and the Christianized State, each with its special task under Christ as Basileus kai Hiereus, but rather one God, one emperor, one religion, and a single-minded dutiful episcopate.”17 Thus, to lie on top of the historical narrative our own political and theological assumptions would entirely miss the assumptions and beliefs of the past for they seem radically different, if not merely pre-modern.

Constructing the Past

The entire narrative is complex to begin with and made far more complex with the lack of sources, not to mention that there is rarely a broad consensus between current historians about what actually happened.18 And as a complex issue, the eventual and correct answer from a historical understanding for the original questions about the influence of imperial power is: yes, no and kind of; which is to say, we are dealing largely with probability, similar to Constantine’s conversion, whenever that really was.19 The over arching answer simply put is: everyone is attempting to use everyone else. It seems that at the time, Christians are attempting to use imperial power, as imperial power is attempting to use Christians, all the while we have second hand texts that attempt to denounce or elevate party lines and individuals within along the lines of the bias within the text.

We know of Constantine as a consensus builder, or said in another way, a man in both camps and attempted to balance them in co-existence, although tolerance seemed to be his last resort.20 He raised up a statue that could be interpreted favorably by pagans and Christians alike and he gave the church money and property, but did not give up his title Pontifex Maximus or cease the financial contributions to the pagan cults.21 Likewise, along the same lines, the council itself was a “joint result of an episcopal and imperial decision.”22 It seems that one can solidly say, that in Constantine’s attempt to unify his empire, he became a friend to all sides and a proper politician.

At the same time, as mentioned earlier, the church both welcomed Caesarpapism and eventually, other factions found the imperial power disconcerting and responded towards independence to some degree. Nevertheless, there was always some sort of relation between Church and State, be it a bishop as imperial legate or Constantine himself.23

It is clear that Constantine called the Council, seeking unity, but it is also true that Constantine did not have direct access to controlling the Council itself; both Constantine and the bishops kept him distanced from control, as he could not vote and he treated the bishops with respect in their own council.24 Perhaps there was subterfuge somewhere or the emperor attempted to script part of the council, but this is all conjecture and unknowable. Likewise, the puppeteer who originally suggested Homoousion, be it Constantine, Housio or someone else, we will probably never know short of finding new documents.

Addressing History Correctly as a Theologian
History can only speak to the facts, rarely to conjecture even with a large caveat, and never to a “what if” question. Facts in this case are relatively low in number and disinformation is high. Thus, what we can begin to judge is whether or not calling the councils, through imperial means, did harm to the church. Did the church lose itself as it began to grow or did it adapt to the opportunities at hand? This is ultimately the question that Hauerwas seeks to answer and he can begin to answer this without resorting to leaning on conjecture or assumptions that because the emperor suggested something it is tainted or an attempt to control.

Thus, in order for Hauerwas to rightly begin to speak about “Constantianism” as a Christian shift towards combining with secular, and possibly evil, power structures, he ought to look later where synchronization seems in full swing and the examples are blatant and plentiful, rather than shrouded in mystery.

Perhaps also, Hauerwas would do well to look at where the Church seems to be reneging its Christian call as he defines it, rather than looking specifically for the imperial power subjecting the church to the secular. Ultimately, no matter what the secular power attempts to do, be it Theodosius I or Diocletian’s persecution, it is the church that allows or rejects the intrusion and thus, the church is responsible for its own secularization. It seems that Hauerwas would do better to focus on the church allowing the emperor who has retained the title Pontifex Maximus to sit in the council and speak, rather than basing a great deal on the Edict of Milan and Homoousion.25

________
1. Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in a Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1992) and The Hauerwas Reader edited by John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

2. Robert Grant, “Religion and Politics at the Council of Nicaea” The Journal of Religion, 55 (Jan., 1975), 1.

3. Ibid., 1.

4. Johannes Straub, “Constantine as ###### ######### Tradition and Innovation in the Representation of the First Christian Emperor’s Majesty” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 21 (1967), 48-49.

5. Ibid., 47-48.

6. Victor C. De Clercq, Ossius of Cordova (Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1954), 218-281. Francis Dvornik, “Emperors, Popes, and General Councils” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 6 (1951), 10. John McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 74, 172-173. Though some think it improbable that Ossius suggested the word, nevertheless, Hanson states it is also improbably that the word originated from Constantine. RPC Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988), 201-202.

7. “Eusebius, Lactantius and others….” “The bulk of the written material is by Christians about christiainity, thus strongly illuminating one side of Constantine’s character and life but leaving another in deep shadow. Modern scholars usually submit to this balance of light, rightly if they are studying the reign as an important episode in the history of the Church, wrongly if they are studying it on its own terms and for its own sake.” Ramsay MacMullen, Constantine (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 243-244.

8. Emperor as Pontifex Maximus in Colm Luibhéid, The Council of Nicaea (Ireland: Galway University Press, 1982), 12-16.

9. George Huntston Williams, “Christology and Church-State Relations” Church History, 20 (1951), 8-10.

10. Ibid., 22.

11. Johannes Roldanus, The Church in the Age of Constantine: The Theological Challenges (New York: Routledge, 2006), 60-61. Williams, 6-8. Massey H. Shepard, Jr., “Liturgical Expressions of the Constantinian Triumph” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 21 (1967), 78.

12. Williams, 22-23.

13. Shepard, 74-75.

14. From discussion with Professor McGuckin and also in McGuckin, 74-75.

15. Williams, 9-10.

16. McGuckin, 74-75. Dale Irvin and Scott Sunquist, History of the World Christian Movement Volume 1: Earliest Christianity to 1453 (New York: Orbist Books, 2006), 177.

17. Williams, 19.

18. I have even come across at least three different dates for the beginning of the Council of Nicaea, and this speaks to the lack of consensus between historians on the small details, much less the more important subjects.

19. T. G. Elliott, “Constantine’s Conversion: Do We Really Need It?” Pheonix, 41 (1987), 420.

20. Grant, 2.

21. Straub, 44, 46-47.

22. Francis Dvornik, “Emperors, Popes, and General Councils” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 6 (1951), 9.

23. Grant, 5.

24. Ibid., 7.

25. Resident Aliens, 17.

Works Consulted but not Cited
Barnes, Timothy. Constantine and Eusebius. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Drake, H. A. Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.

_____, and Eusebius. In Praise of Constantine. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.

Meyendorff, John. Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions: The Church 450-680 A.D. Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1989.

Young, Frances. From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and its Background. Philedelphia: Fortress Press, 1983.

Saturday, April 21, 2007

Moving towards a Metzian Ecclesiology

What is the most fundamental element or key insight that would have to be internalized before [Metz's ecclesiology] would become convincing to the congregation?

The American Christians must realize their social relationships and leave privatization before they can accept the whole of Metz’s ecclesiology.

A Bourgeois religion is dependent on privatization; in order to envision the Messianic nature of Christianity (MBR 12), we must first understand who we are. How we see ourselves is less universally governed by the church’s direction or definition, rather, as American’s our most universal understanding as to who we are is fundamentally through individual and nation-state interaction.

The American social contract – our constitution – is an enlightenment document that privatizes citizens; this country’s foundational anthropological lens is a privatized lens. The state converses, or coerces, the individual and vice versa, however, it is really only a two-person discussion: the individual and the state. There is no room for social organizations within the Constitution, even corporations are viewed in the eyes of the law as individual persons.

The American Christians needs to realize the influences of the Constitution and understand how the idea of a church is fundamentally a contrary social institution – the body of Christ (CWLPT 133). We can only get to the Christian call when we get past the American Dream and its hope (CR 146).

In the end, I am not calling for the burning of the Constitution or total anarchy, however, I am calling for the awakening of conscience in the American church to understand that the relationship with the government has been unhealthy for the body of Christ; the government defines us, instead of us finding definition amongst ourselves as the body of Christ, and we must first realize that the anthropology given to us by the government is not a Christian anthropology. We can still deal with the government, however, we should realize how that interaction changes us and from that understanding, we can begin to find freedom in relationship within the body.
________
Metz's cited texts:

"Messianic or 'Bourgeois' Religion" (MBR)
"The Church and the World in the light of 'Political Theology'" (CWLPT)
"Christian Responsiblity for Planning the Future in a Secular World" (CR)

Pictures

I added some pretty pictures of Union in spring to my flickr account here. Go have a look see.

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Thoughts on Hermeneutics

Note: this post, like so many others, is the product of a class assignment, however, that is not to say I have not been thinking about this sort of thing on my own for quite sometime. There are clearly some holes within the post (like I say nothing about Barth and Word), but I think this begins to get to where I am currently at. Keep in mind that this also had to meet some professor specified requirements and although I have stripped away some unneccessary text for the internet, the form is still similar to what I turned in - when you wonder why I am actually looking at three views more indepth, it is because the prof wanted that. Anyways, enough talk, here are some thoughts on hermeneutics.

My Social Location and the Beginning of My Hermeneutic

In terms of social categories, I am the oppressor – Caucasian, male, and affluent. I am white and my genealogical makeup is European; it is German, Scottish, Irish, English, French Canadian and even has a hint of Icelandic red. Although my extended family has been in the North American continent for just over a century, it would seem that we have been here for longer – not because they come from old money (which they do not), instead there is a silence about the past and a sense of ownership and entitlement in the present that creates an atmosphere where the success of the past thirty years seems to re-create our entire story in terms of work and wealth. Granted there has been profound tragedy, separation between family members, and lower class status (during my parents’ childhood), however, that only serves to further the narcissism, rather than calling into question the truth of the family’s perception or bring people closer together. I come from a self-blinding family of white riches earned through the American dream and the power of oil.

Ironically, for all the money, hard work and conservative evangelical roots, my family is disconnected to say the least, and when there are relationships, they are generally warped through the lenses of patriotism, fear, imperialism, pain, wealth, and anger. I will say, that as they age, my family has developed and matured as persons (and maybe a cohesive family) in many ways, however, in the categories that Union cares about (mainly systemic oppression), my family is the quintessential oppressor – ignorant to their privilege and the pain of others.

As a Christian I have begun to react to what I see as wrong within my family and the church. I started with a problem that I saw in the evangelical church – that it lacks cohesion and relationality. Instead of brothers and sisters gathering for encouragement and support for themselves and those in the surrounding community, the church in my eyes seemed like a poorly done academic lecture with the inclusion of a popular sub-culture that had no intention of addressing the holistic needs of people. I saw to be the root of the problem to be the presupposition of individualism over community instead of the relational nature of the church acting like the body of Christ. My struggle for envisioning a right community led me towards kingdom theology – that is, the body of Christ enacting now the values of the suffering Christological and eschatological kingdom.

The church I was involved with (during my undergrad at a Bible College) was a group of believers that lived out the Christian call of prayer, preaching, and upbuilding and correction.1 I have never been so encouraged or supported in my life. I have never seen so few people meet the needs of so many people around them within the community, be it the Christian or secular communities. It is with this theology and experience that I begin my interpretations of the text.

Other Considerations – Some of My Basic Assumptions

First and foremost, we deal with a text and without access to the actual data that formed the text. Techniques of pre-rhetorical form are interesting and help one understand that the text was indeed fashioned in its own way by humans, how the text was influenced before it was written down, and as a possible indication as to the structure of the current text. Nevertheless, twenty-first century academics do not have access to the oral tradition, nor do we have access to “Q”, among other texts that would have helped form the text we have now. Method without the data itself seems a tenuous situation of theories based only on what can be dug up and thus I begin with the text that, for good or ill, Christians call Holy Scripture.

The Nature of the Text
We primarily deal with text that we find, to in some way, call scripture. The word scripture means that the text “is ‘authority’ for the common life of the Christian community.”2 And in as much scripture is authoritative for the community, “these texts are the church’s scripture”, and so this text is formative for the community, for the church – the community of faith.3 On another note, the use of the word scripture denotes “some kind of ‘wholeness” or canon.4 Thus, to call the biblical text scripture, is to say that the Bible is in some form an authoritative canon for the life of the community of faith.

As the Bible is a text, it is inherently genre specific, and best understood as a text with multiple genres – ranging from narrative, to poetic, to letter/epistle. Thus, whether reading or analyzing, it is vital to understand what genre the passage lies within; however, genre is a broad term that indicates a more detailed idea of structure like: introductions and closings, narration, story order, poetic devices (i.e. inclusio, repetition, chiasm, etc.), argumentative examples, word choice, how Paul is not writing a systematic theology and so forth. Simply put, analysis of the text as a text is incredibly important for me and, from what I can determine, is a rich tradition within the hermeneutical world and has produced: structuralism, post-structuralism, narrative criticism, rhetorical criticism, and canonical criticism to name a few.

Author, Text and Audience
Interestingly, textual criticism has run into rough waters with the advent of deconstructionism advocated by Jacques Derrida.5 Although there is a perceived demise of platonic language theory, I have found a haven within Speech-Act language theory – a theory that asserts both the author and the audience in relation to meaning are problematic, but the text does maintain meaning. This is to say that the author is inaccessible, but also on the other hand, the audience is not free to create meaning without the voice of the text; instead, the text itself retains meaning and is able to communicate meaning through clues like structure.

Elements of Interpretive Methodology from Class

Me in Relationship to Theories Presented in Class:
A great deal of the interpretive methodologies introduced, while not particularly new to me, were generally attractive to me. On the theme of liberation, I found the post-colonial, liberationist and (for lack of a better term) political-imperial criticism to be fairly interesting, if not convincing. A few summers ago I was listening to a number of recorded N. T. Wright lectures and that probably was the first time I saw the “Lord’s prayer” in a new light – a liberative light – that envisioned and cried out for the heavenly kingdom breaking into the present and against the imperial and false powers, which in that day was Rome. Even I, who am probably more on the conservative side at Union, has found a liberative reading of the Bible from a conservative, Anglican bishop. Also, I think in this context of America’s rule, I can move towards privileging a liberative reading of the Bible while still holding to my current core methodology; I see no reason why liberative readings (advocacy criticism) cannot join and mix with my current interpretive method and be more informative and compelling than a conservative, white, male, Anglican bishop. The result of the mixing would be an even richer and productive methodology for answering the true problems of the current world.

As one can probably tell, I am whole-heartedly for a communitarian hermeneutic and that it is not simply scripture alone, but also the local and universal community of faith that reads and interprets the text together. As far as redactionists, I appreciate the personal treatment given to each section of the text, be it story or sayings, however, redactionists can tend to lose the structure when they look too individually; they can lose the forest for the tree. Thus I prefer the canonical criticism approach that maintains that there is a theological/thematic center to each book and attempts to find the same for the entire Bible. As far as psycho-analytic criticism goes, I am hesitant when they attempt to characterize the author whom I do not think we can know, although I suppose an analysis of the tendencies in the text would prove interesting and likewise for the lens that the audience brings to the text. It is vital in my opinion to scrutinize the assumptions that the audience brings to the text; assumptions govern the types of questions the audience will ask and thus dictate the answers and, in the end, the theology supposedly derived from the text.

Three Theories from Class in Conversation with My Methodology:

Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza (Feminist)
A few years ago I would have been alarmed by feminist hermeneutics, for I was just coming from a house that had a mother who read Paul’s subordination to mean that a wife ought to submit to the husband in a conservative fashion (and she still does). Today my stance is much different, though I am still relatively new to it. At first glance I am worried by looking at a Canon within the Canon – my knee jerk reaction is that one book ought not to be subordinated to another book for no book is a second class citizen – however, I quickly realized that there is always a Canon within the Canon.6 With texts that were written in another context, and not always to us who is an audience 2,000 years later, we naturally drop all sorts of sayings and notions, no matter how literal one might pride themselves in being.

On this basis I have begun to make my peace with the hermeneutic of suspicion. When I came to Union, the view about the text seemed to say the Bible was helpful, but quickly the text turned to something largely distrusted, negative and harmful. It seemed as if the book in front of me transformed into a monster that was grabbing for my throat; I finally saw how truly the Bible could be oppressive. I called myself an egalitarian at Bible college and chided the hierarchical John Piper and Wayne Grudemn fans, but I had yet to really see the frustration from oppression – the women at the school either accepted hierarchy or rarely let out their frustration it seemed (or perhaps I just missed it). It is odd how suppression, in the guise of obedience, eliminates the reality of experience.

First and foremost I think we ought to take Paul seriously, and when we do so, we might encounter patriarchy, but we also encounter a Paul who seems to lead us towards a direction of subversion. It seems to me that Paul might have told people to stay in their place in the secular world (so as to be Christ), but he also told those whom the people are submitting to, to be submitters also. I do not think it a fluke that within the early church both women and slaves had a space to be human and free because the structures of the world were turned upside down. Paul could have been a chauvinist, or the text seems to reflect the patriarchal time in which it was written, and we should take those negatives seriously to see the humanity in the writings,7 but we should also notice that sometimes in the same breath the text moves towards freedom. Perhaps seeing a flawed text moving towards the suffering and risen eschatological kingdom is the best thing ever for those 2,000 years later who are doing the same thing within the same community of faith.

Vincent L. Wimbush ("Darkly")
Similar to feminist criticism, the African American hermeneutic that speaks about the African American experience and church approaches the text with a heremeneutic of suspicion; however, Wimbush is not speaking about gender, but race. Wimbush seeks to show theology the African American lens so to break white theologians out of their incorrectly narrow theology – a theology that sees only the white person, for it envisions a white Jesus.8 This idea is certainly nothing new after taking Prof. Cone’s systematic class last semester, nevertheless it is still powerful every time it is used for theology still seems to exist to some degree within whiteness.

However I wonder what happens when one enters into the church – the community of faith. Does this change how we see race or gender? Certainly oppression is not sanctioned, however, what happens once within the community? I have recently encountered an essay by J. Kameron Carter of Duke Divinity School titled “Christology, or Redeeming Whiteness: A Response to James Perkinson’s Appropriation of Black Theology.”9 Certainly there is the agreement to “call the white church to a deeper faithfulness to its Lord” and that Lord’s power instead of the power of whiteness; however, liturgy, and in particular baptism, is then what?10 Carter instead understands baptism as “induction into a different mode of being in the world, one that surpasses the mode of being whose nodal points are hegemonic and counterhegemonic.”11 Best understood, the induction into the community through baptism “involves handing oneself over to God in Christ so as to receive oneself back as a gift… [and thus] to receive Christ himself” on Christ’s terms and “mission” which moves from Martin Buber’s and James Cone’s use of I-Thou and into a political body in which exists a “different way of being.”12 I bring Carter’s essay up because itself has come up in discussions I have had with others on the topic of Black Liberation theology and this essay is already in dialogue with Cone inside my head, although it is unresolved. This is the question that chases after me now, now that I have been sensitized toward racism in theology.

Historical-Critical
Historical-criticism is something I appreciate, but am largely skeptical of. I disagree with the fundamental precept that we will actually know the author of the text.13 The author to Job is indeterminable, much less when the text was written, and while many books within the New Testament are certainly closer to our time than Job, the historical author seems still beyond our reach because of Derrida and my own experience of history. One of my majors in undergrad was a history major and I wrote a thesis that involved both primary and secondary sources around a rather unknown but controversial topic.14 Through my experience I discovered the utter reliance a historian has the texts and the baggage that comes with the texts, and I began to wonder how far history can inform humanity – certainly no more than concretely than, “it was probably like this from what we can determine at this time.” Ironically, history can only speak to what it has dug up and analyzed at that time, rather than stating for once what life was like; the past is always under construction and revision.

Another concern for me is those who use history, but do not have the adequate background. For instance, I have seen, in both the pulpit and the class room, the speaker who gives too much weight to one theory, without mentioning the other theories that are equally viable, and thus the speaker incorrectly privileges the theory to look like fact – I have seen Christians do terrible history, committing moves that the historical community would laugh at, and I want to avoid the disinformation and embarrassment. Likewise, I also want to avoid elevating the privileged theory to canonical status (one might call this midrashing with history), despite how unpopular it might be here at Union. We are Christians who have a text we call scripture and we ought to deal with it as such.

I have also lately become aware of a possible problem concerning the reliance on history for theology through Jürgen Moltmann’s chapter on the nature of history in his book Theology of Hope.15 His critique about history as a philosophy of crisis seems insightful concerning many schools of history. While Moltmann’s argument may or may not have aged well and has been adequately responded to, I am still concerned that the presumptions by current philosophical history (though at least excluding the Marxist historians) can, without examination, shape theology towards the French revolution instead of the cross and resurrection.

Despite all the negativity and urge to separate the categories of theology and history, there is within me a sympathy for history and certainly a few concessions. Without the study of the past, there would be no text – Greek would be gibberish. Even for the literary person who wants to avoid historical-criticism because of the language theory critique, the translation of a text is indebted to the study of languages; without an understanding of word meaning amongst various languages of the time like Syriac and Coptic, Greek would be indecipherable.

Also, I find interesting what history does have to say. I think I have the background to envision what history is actually saying (which is always less than we think) and therefore determining what is helpful that history claims. However, I still handle history as if it is apocrypha (though I still handle it) insomuch that it is outside of the canon, because it is, and therefore also outside of the community of faith’s interpretation.


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1. This church, The Church of the Servant King, is part of the “New Monastic Movement” and is committed to the church as community. They have also been largely informed by recent ecclesial writings, particularly Stanley Hauewas. The Hauerwas Reader, edited by John Berkman and Michael Carwright (Durham: Duke University, 2002), 384-385. A list of what the church is and does: charity/hospitality; valuing both the married and single equally; fiscal responsibility and leveraging of resources for the needs of people; living simply; racially diverse; inclusion of all ages; resisting the Kingdom of Evil; and the list goes on.

2. The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology by David H. Kelsey (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 89.

3. Ibid., 89.

4. Ibid., 89.

5. Is There A Meaning In this Text? by Kevin Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998).

6. In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins by Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 14.

7. Ibid., 18.

8. “Reading Darkness, Reading Scriptures” in African Americans and The Bible: Sacred Texts and Social Textures by Vincent L. Wimbush (New York: Continuum), 8-9.

9. “Christology, or Redeeming Whiteness: A Response to James Perkinson’s Appropriation of Black Theology” by J. Kameron Carter, Theology Today, 60, number 4, January 2004.

10. Ibid., 526.

11. Ibid., 537.

12. Ibid., 538.

13. An Introduction to the New Testament by Raymond E. Brown (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 35.

14. Titled: “Truth, Dare, and Death: Epistemological Conflict Between Quakers and Puritans in Boston, Massachusetts from 1656-1661.”

15. Theology of Hope by Jürgen Moltmann (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 261. Although, perhaps I would do well to review one of the books for my Historiography class, History in Crisis? by Norman J. Wilson. This paragraph is meant to speak to a concern and question that has recently popped up within the last week in relation to other classes, rather than to give an answer.

Thursday, April 12, 2007

The Church and Race Part 3: Trinitarian Solidarity

I am excited to hear that at my undergrad, Multnomah Bible College, Dr. John Perkins is giving lectures. Coming to Union last semester was dramatically different to say the least (though it was something I was looking for) and in that difference I found myself reading and listening to critiques, some solid and others flimsy. Here following is part three of three responsorial writings to three books I read for Social Ethics as Social Criticism dealing with race, as I presume some of Multnomah is going through too.

Part 3The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after Postmodernism, by Anselm Min (New York: T&T Clark 2004).

For the most part, I liked this book. Before reading the book, I had never encountered Emmanuel Levinas and only had a decent working knowledge of Jacques Derrida; however, Anselm Min wrote The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World in such a clear and readable fashion that my use of reference materials were minimal. Certainly Min’s language was a bit different than what I am used to, but, after a short time, his language seemed like second nature and in fact, maybe even a better way of describing the universal – totality.

In the past few years, I have discovered Trinitarian theologians, like Colin Gunton, and even more recently, the suffering, Trinitarian Christology of Moltmann. With this in mind, it seems obvious I would like this book, but aside from the prolific use of Moltmann (and critique), I found that the author addressed a topic that has literally been on my mind for years – “the oddity of the Holy Spirit” (109). The social nature of the Trinity is clear, after all the words Father and Son are relational terms of identity; however, the Holy Spirit seems to lack a similar relational name. Min answers well the question with verse after verse from the Bible and finally concluding with the selfless nature of the Spirit and the role the Spirit plays as the one “who actualizes the full potentialities of the model” – a relator for others (118, 121, 125).

I found it a wonderful stroke to ground solidarity as a reflection of the social God and inherently within the Trinitarian framework – to the Christ of God by way of the cohesive Spirit. Granted much of what Min is saying is not necessarily new because he grounds so much in Moltmann, but the way Min says it is new for it is geared towards the first steps of communion – solidarity – as the next step for theology. Also, Min is talking ecclesiology throughout his book when he says solidarity, and that the church, or better said the body of Christ, finds not only unity in the past and future acts of the suffering, resurrected Christ, but also in the now through the Holy Spirit.

Another chapter in the book that delighted me was “Solidarity of Others in the Body of Christ.” I have found this particular metaphor of the body of Christ to be particularly rich and vivid. I was thrilled that Min covered the variety of subjects that the metaphor addresses and I know it will be a reference in the future merely because of its brevity and clarity.

However, I am unsure as to the success that Min achieves when addressing pluralism. I myself am undecided on the extent for Christianity and pluralism. The body of Christ seems a great metaphor for explaining Christianity’s identity in the world where it interacts with religions, but as Min notes, the metaphor is at least partially exclusive (150). I know some classmates will object, but if the church (Christianity) does not draw its identity from Christ, what then makes it Christian? I think Min makes a good point, that within a pluralistic world, being Christian does not mean one does not have boundaries; rather that, Christianity confesses its own boundaries, enters into sensitive dialogue with other religions and finds commonality from which to work together (150, 174, 175).

The Church and Race Part 2: Proper Liturgy Only When in Diversity

I am excited to hear that at my undergrad, Multnomah Bible College, Dr. John Perkins is giving lectures. Coming to Union last semester was dramatically different to say the least (though it was something I was looking for) and in that difference I found myself reading and listening to critiques, some solid and others flimsy. Here following is part two of three responsorial writings to three books I read for Social Ethics as Social Criticism dealing with race, as I presume some of Multnomah is going through too.

Part 2Disruptive Christian Ethics: When Racism and Women’s Lives Matter, by Traci C. West (Louisville: Westminster Press, 2006).

I was particularly interested with the chapter on liturgy. Having read Theopolitical Imagination (I am sorry if I am beginning to sound like a broken record), I was looking in West’s chapter on liturgy specifically for a treatment on the Eucharist. Cavanaugh, in my opinion, writes wonderfully about the death of Rutilio Grande and the response of Archbishop Oscar Romero – a single mass (121-122). The Eucharist broke through economic barriers bringing together rich and poor. And so reading Disruptive Christian Ethics, I was excited to see that liturgy was included. I would have liked to have seen more from West on baptism and communion, but even with the limited treatment, I feel like she brought an important component of race to my thought, which I will tease out here.

Liturgy accomplishes multiple functions: personal reflection, a visible representation of the body of Christ, unity, and “recogniz[ing] and contest[ing] repressive cultural norms like white superiority” to name a few (112). For instance, the Eucharist: prompts personal reflection on the person and work of Jesus Christ; visibly depicts the body of Christ in both time and space before one’s eyes; brings to light the unity in the body of Christ (both visible and universal); and thus, in theory, portrays each Christian as a human being of equal worth and equal acceptance.

However, white dominance (117), or white isolation, breaks the tangible image of the body of Christ existing in the world. The universal body of Christ is made up of all types of people, of all skin colors, and for a local church to be racially dominated by whiteness creates a Eucharist that is fundamentally myopic and thus a poor misrepresentation of the Eucharist. The body and blood no longer visibly shows the breadth of the church, nor does it portray each Christian as equally accepted. The representation of only whiteness can only lead to personal reflection (a personal reflection that is probably inherently white too), unless the Christian is confronted by a church that looks like him/herself.

The specific liturgical form of the Eucharist in my church in Portland, Oregon is different from the norm and I think one of the most powerful ways I have ever encountered the church and subsequently the Eucharist. The way in which they give the elements is helpful in retaining a sense of equality and importance – they share it together, literally. Instead of getting in a line to individually receive the bread and drink, they circle around the drink (the bread has already been dispensed), pick up the cup, take it to another person, let them drink, and then give words of encouragement or solidarity. They do this over and over again, making sure no one is left out and that we each gave to those whom we individually sought to affirm. Across racial lines (and there are multiple racial lines), this congregation personally ministers to itself, and in my mind, truly fulfilling the function of the Eucharist ritual.

The Church and Race Part 1: Inclusion

I am excited to hear that at my undergrad, Multnomah Bible College, Dr. John Perkins is giving lectures. Coming to Union last semester was dramatically different to say the least (though it was something I was looking for) and in that difference I found myself reading and listening to critiques, some solid and others flimsy. Here following is part one of three responsorial writings to three books I read for Social Ethics as Social Criticism dealing with race, as I presume some of Multnomah is going through too.

Part 1 Risks of Faith: The Emergence of a Black Theology of Liberation, 1968-1998, by James H. Cone (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999).

James Cone’s book Risks of Faith, I have to admit, was convicting. I come from the evangelical tradition and a fundamentalist home. While I left the literalist roots, the evangelical doctrine continues to hold some sway. During my time in undergrad, under the influence of authors and friends, I came to hold a quasi-Mennonite stance. Also Kingdom theology, championed by Moltmann, Pannenberg and others, has largely shaped me, and fits well (in my mind) within the Anabaptist tradition. Kingdom theology leads to Kingdom ethics; thus when I think ethics, I think to care for the poor and the widow.

I was so focused on the poor and the widow, I neglected other aspects of theology; I was too simplistic. It felt like Cone specifically talked to me when he addressed hope theology: “white American theologians have been virtually silent on black liberation, preferring instead to do theology in the light of a modern liberalism that assumes that black people want to integrate into the white way of life" (27). I was and am fully aware that the poor are stuck at the bottom in a system of power structures; nevertheless, for all intents and purposes, I saw it as merely economic injustice – not also racial. Kingdom theology can cohere with Liberation theology, and to some degree it had for me, but I lacked the color dimension.

However, the book was far from done with me. As pitiful an excuse as it may sound, I felt that I was not allowed previously into the discussion. Whether it is culture, my up bringing, or whatever, I felt that since I was not black, I had no right to speak. I’ve been silent. Cone, however, has called me out. I felt invited into the discussion of racism, particularly in the chapter “White Theology Revisited.” My theology should reflect the richness of all the Christian traditions. I can and should include black theology right along side Yoder, Grenz, and Hauerwas. If I aim to teach theology at a college somewhere and one of the first classes I want to do will incorporate the non-white, non-male, and non-heterosexual theologies – essentially, liberationists. I especially see the need to do this at the Bible College I went to, not to be the token class that covers recent movements (for they already have one that briefly glosses over black theology and feminism), but to interact with the traditions that the evangelical world has marginalized. I want to balance out the white theology and incorporate the other voices.

I do have a concern though: violence. I first want to preface that I have come to hold some sort of loose pacifism, or better described as, peace ethic. My value of peace and non-violence stems from Kingdom ethics – the Kingdom is here but not here, however, as Christians we should endeavor to spread the Kingdom through Kingdom acts (i.e. non-violence). Also, the Kingdom liberates people and contradicts earthly power structures. Cone allows for violence, but I do not…I think. I understand that the oppressed should not work within the oppressor’s paradigm, yet at the same time, I believe the Kingdom not only liberates, but addresses the world and its evil in entirely different ways than the world acts. For now I disagree with Cone on the tactics of liberation, not because I am white and worried about the status quo, rather because I think the Kingdom ethics include non-violence and liberation together.

Wednesday, April 4, 2007

Moltmann and Metz

Note: I know earlier I said I was done reposting from myspace, but I realized that the theses I put up would probably do a lot better on blogger than on myspace.

I am taking a class from Professor Haight on Jürgen Moltmann and Johann Baptist Metz. And in the class we present weekly papers. The parameters for the paper are rather specific: a short thesis at the beginning, interact with the readings, address one of the themes, answer the question posed by Haight, and prove/display your thesis in 300 words or less. So here reposted are three theses.

Part 1

The question we were to answer was: which theme, out of the many themes (of which secularization was one), do we find the most crucial for today? I went with secularization (which Metz spends a long time talking about), but I also saw the connection between another theme that Metz addresses over and over - Auschwitz.

Thesis: The memory of Auschwitz has been supplanted within the church by the secularized American hope to the detriment of the church.


Our culture, as Metz shows, has become increasingly hominized (The Future of Faith 57). While it seems we may be shifting back towards a more cosmological idea due to scientific discoveries, these breakthroughs have had little effect on some aspects of secularization, namely an ideological, secularized hope – a hope that clings to the idea that humanity will overcome, thrive, and conquer future frontiers. It is the secularized and nationalistic hope provided by Reagan (one of many proponents) that has become a controlling ideology that Metz warned against (The Future of Faith 68). This ideology of hope has taken hold of even the American church by mimicking the eschatological Christian hope and, instead of liberating, the ideology holds the globe within Americana's oppressive custody (Theology in Struggle 55). Thus the American church has ceased remembering the atrocities of Auschwitz for the hope of American promises.

It is no wonder that the church has largely ignored Darfur, for the American church has found its hope in the bright, anthropological destiny preached by Reagan. Consequently the church has held to theologies that remain unchanged and unresponsive in the face of Darfur, much less other civil wars, starvation, and drought. We have in turn lost the "messianic praxis" of "discipleship, conversion, love, and suffering", because we have accepted the secularized notion of a nationalistic hope (Christians and Jews 27). With unchanged theologies and the forgetting of Christian suffering, the church does not act in its prophetic role to the world. The secularization of the church through a form of secular hominization has caused us to lose not only the idea of suffering with and for others, but we have also lost ourselves.

Summary for the net: when the church here rejects the Christological hope of the cross and the future for the nationalistic hope of america (we accept the secular hope), we lose our ability to reach out for those who are oppressed -- this acceptance of the American dream (and American "Manifest Destiny) by the church is killing our ability to be the church.

Part 2

This paper covers about the first hundred and forty pages of Theology of Hope.

Thesis: Moltmann's vision consists of hopeful promises revealed in dynamic history finding their culmination in the now, future and ultimate horizon.


The foundation of Moltmann's vision (hope) comes from the revelatory promises of God; hope, driving theology, is rooted in promise, and therefore, capable of standing in "contradiction to the reality" of present experience (18). These promises come in the midst of history, but at the same time orient a believer from the "dawn" of the day, looking forward with expectation although still mired in one's circumstances (31).

Since history is framed by promise, history is in flux, which is to say, that history is dynamic. The fulfillment of promise continues throughout history, and this "overspill" changes history from merely singularly event oriented to a continual fulfillment or revelation of the promise (107-108). Thus the active story that history tells, framed by promises, is re-imagined at every fulfillment; the promises become larger and larger as the fulfillments become bigger and bigger (105). Thus history, or the representation of the past, is changed continually in light of the revelation of promise/fulfillment and in turn "will lead us to open ourselves and our present to that same future" (108).

However, hope is not merely related to promises, but also fuels our human faith, in fact, hope and faith are inextricably linked. Faith, our belief in the divine, "hopes in order to know what it believes"; it is hope, from our faith, that drives our vitality so necessary to faith (33). Thus faith and the hope of the future explodes the future into the present and the future to come, resulting in church engagement with the world funneling the vision of the future – "righteousness, freedom and humanity" – into the current events of today (22).

Part 3

Here again is another thesis and taken from Theology of Hope.

Thesis: Moltmann's term "eschatological" is defined by a forward-looking, Christological dialectic between the cross and resurrection within the kingdom of God.


To understand the cross and resurrection, particularly as the basis for eschatology and the breaking in of the kingdom, it is necessary to understand death and re-life as a theological category, as opposed to an andocentric idea; cross and resurrection is fundamentally not existential (Bultmann) or historical (Schweitzer), but rather an action that makes our history and locating us within a promise and identity, while pushing us toward the eschaton (165, 181).

The heart of Moltmann's use of the term "eschatological" is found in the Christological dialectic of the cross and resurrection (200), this is to say, that both the suffering death and glorious resurrection retain an equal amount of weight and continually informing the other, all the while, both push us forward into the promise and hope of the future horizon (211). Simply put, "one could say that Christian eschatology is the study of the tendency of the resurrection and future of Christ" (195).

While eschatology finds its specific understanding in the cross and resurrection, we cannot rightly understand the death and resurrection without the greater foundation of the kingdom of God (216). It is in the cross and resurrection that the kingdom and its promises are fulfilled and proclaimed; the kingdom breaks into the current reality in proclamation and action about and through the cross and resurrection (the conquering of death, 210-211), and at the same time speaking of a future through the "mission and love of Christ" through cross and resurrection (220).

Eschatological also has another aspect that is inherently participatory; we proclaim Christ as the Christ who proclaimed the kingdom (219), while at the same time we imbue the missional idea in Christ-like suffering and solidarity (211, 212, 224).

Tuesday, April 3, 2007

Torture and Class - as if they're different...

Alright theoblogosphere, I've got a little challenge of my own (however it is not nearly as demanding as Halden's recent one). I'm looking at taking a few classes here at school over the summer - primarily reading classes, and I get to pick the topics. Well, I'm going to address torture for my social ethics MA thesis (or at least I'm planning on it right now and it might look a little something like this: I. Why American Christianity is inclined to accept torture; II. Critique American Christianity; and III. Produce a better theology which A. Fills the holes in the church and B. Talks about what a healthy church can do to respond). With that in mind I'm hoping to use one of these reading classes to help me get a leg up on research and forming a better outline. So, does anyone have any good books to recommend other than William Cavanaugh's Torture and Eucharist for me to read this summer?

Sunday, April 1, 2007

Theological Frustrations

This is also a repost from my myspace (and my last), but it is also fairly recent, as in... oh last friday.

I was reading a friend's blog and the comments left on an article of his. One of the comments cites theopedia and I came away annoyed for two reasons.

First, I've looked at theopedia before, but I've been put off because on first look it seems like a democratized wikipedia, but it really *only* allows for a reformed and a hyper-literalized methodolical outlook which in my book restricts the conversation about the subject or the richness of the articles themselves. Encyclopedia's do not have statments of faith.

"All of Theopedia's content is, in accordance with the writing guide, required to conform to the following:

... Calvinism - Inasmuch as this refers to the five points of Calvinism and absolute predesination, we affirm it.

... Creation - We affirm a literal understanding of six-day creation."

Not to mention that personally an editor must affirm:

"We believe the Bible is the written word of God, inspired by the Holy Spirit and without error in the original manuscripts. The Bible is the revelation of God's truth and is infallible and authoritative in all matters of faith and practice."

Barth could not be allowed to be involved in the shaping of the website. Um... thats a fairly large exclusion and seems entirely counter to the point of theology - discussion. So point #1, one ought to proceed through theopedia with caution.

Unfortunately on the other hand, Gunton summaries do not seem to have a large presence on the internet, or Trinitarian Theology as a whole for that matter. Neither the Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Western Theology or Religion Online devote specific space, which is clearly a hole that will hopefully be fixed. The hole is worrisome, but points to a greater problem, or at least something that I think is problematic - the conversation about, or lack thereof, of Trinitarian theology.

Here at Union, whenever I refer back to a social Trinitarian God within my papers, teachers write good marks about it, but it rarely comes up in class. Thus, there isn't necessarily a lack of acceptance in a very liberal seminary, but rather, little talk on it. And so I wonder, if Trinitarian theology is accepted by all manner of theologians, why is there seemingly little talk about it on the internet? It is not that people don't ever talk about Gunton's work or are impacted by it, so why is there seemingly, on the whole, a lack of talk on recent Trinitarian work?